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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 18-2177 
______________ 
 
PAR PHARMACEUTICAL, INC.; PAR STERILE PRODUCTS, LLC, 
                    
v. 
 
QUVA PHARMA, INC.; STUART HINCHEN; PETER JENKINS; MIKE 
RUTKOWSKI; DONNA KOHUT; DAVID SHORT; STEPHEN RHOADES; TRAVIS 
MCGRADY; DAVID HARTLEY 
 
QUVA Pharma, Inc.; Stuart Hinchen; Peter Jenkins; Mike Rutkowski, 
   Appellants 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 3-17-cv-06115) 
District Judge: Hon. Brian R. Martinotti 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges. 
  
(Opinion Filed:  April 3, 2019) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
  
QuVa Pharma, Inc., Stuart Hinchen, Peter Jenkins, and Mike Rutkowski 
(collectively, “QuVa”) appeal an order preliminarily enjoining them from marketing and 
selling vasopressin pharmaceutical products.  Because the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, we will affirm in part and remand for 
further fact-finding. 
I 
 Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. (“Par”) brought suit against QuVa alleging, among other 
things, that QuVa misappropriated Par’s trade secrets “relating to Vasostrict® and other 
vasopressin products” that it markets.  J.A. 117.  Vasostrict is a Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) approved intravenous vasopressin injection used to increase 
blood pressure in adults with vasodilatory shock.   
 Par alleges that Par former executives Stuart Hinchen and Peter Jenkins left Par 
and formed a new pharmaceutical company, QuVa, to compete with Par.  Hinchen and 
Jenkins hired several Par employees to join QuVa, allegedly targeting them for their 
“intimate knowledge of [Par’s trade secrets] and other confidential information regarding 
sterile manufacturing, Vasostrict®, and Par’s other vasopressin products.”  J.A. 106.  
Based on QuVa’s new hires and its development of its own vasopressin product, Par 
asserted that QuVa misappropriated Par’s vasopressin trade secrets, in violation of, 
among other things, federal and New Jersey law.     
 Par sought a preliminary injunction to stop QuVa’s sale of competing aseptic 
products.  Following expedited discovery, and after considering the parties’ voluminous 
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submissions and arguments, the District Court granted Par’s preliminary injunction 
motion.1  The Court found that Par demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on 
the merits concerning at least two of its trade secret misappropriation claims.  Par 
asserted that QuVa misappropriated (1) Par’s Aseptic Process Simulation Master Plan 
(“APS Plan”), which outlines procedures important for regulatory compliance; and 
(2) certain aspects of Par’s vasopressin-product formulation, which QuVa allegedly used 
to generate the formulation for a competing vasopressin product.  As to the APS Plan 
claim, the Court concluded that it was reasonably likely that the APS Plan constituted a 
trade secret because Par’s expert identified examples of purported non-public information 
within it, and “while some individual elements of the APS Plan may be known in the 
industry, Par’s combination of the elements . . . constitute[s] a trade secret.”  J.A. 20.  
The Court also found that Par would likely be able to demonstrate QuVa misappropriated 
the APS plan because Par produced evidence that: (1) a Par employee working at QuVa 
both (a) sent Par’s Plan to an outside consultant to help QuVa develop its APS Plan,2 and 
(b) admitted that he later deleted Par’s APS Plan and other Par documents from his 
                                              
1 QuVa claims that the District Court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing, 
but QuVa asked “that the motion be decided on the papers or after oral argument.”  J.A. 
229.  Thus, QuVa opposed Par’s request for an evidentiary hearing and cannot now 
complain such a hearing was not held.  Quva’s “alternative” request that if the Court 
“elects to schedule an evidentiary hearing, . . . it be held as soon as possible . . . ,” id., 
does not save QuVa from having waived its challenge.  See Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. 
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[Defendant], having been content to 
rest on affidavits submitted to the District Court [at the preliminary injunction stage], 
waived its right to an evidentiary hearing.”). 
2 The District Court also alluded to the fact that this former Par employee removed 
the Par logos from the original document before forwarding it to QuVa’s consultant.   
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thumb-drive after receiving a litigation hold, and (2) several parts of Par’s and QuVa’s 
plans are identical.   
As to the vasopressin-product formulation claim, the District Court concluded that 
Par had a reasonable probability of demonstrating that its use of a specific diluent and 
other aspects of its formulation were trade secrets in light of the evidence of the extensive 
process that went into determining the specific formulation.  This was in stark contrast 
with the sparse evidence QuVa produced of independent development.  In addition, the 
Court rejected QuVa’s argument that Par had publicly disclosed its use of a specific 
diluent in Par’s Patent Publication No. US 2017/0290881 (“’881 Application”) before 
QuVa’s misappropriation, as “the ’881 [Application] was published months after 
Defendants began preparing to manufacture vasopressin.”  J.A. 24.   
The District Court further held that: (1) Par showed irreparable harm by 
demonstrating that, if QuVa’s vasopressin product were allowed to proceed to market, 
Par would suffer a significant loss in revenue from reduced sales of its current 
vasopressin products and a resulting reduction in funds for investment in its business; and 
(2) the balance of the equities and the public’s interest in protection of trade secrets 
favored issuance of an injunction through trial, and not just the few days it would 
purportedly take for independent development of an APS Plan because the APS Plan was 
“not the only basis on which Par has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits 
of its misappropriation claims.”  J.A. 28. 
QuVa appeals. 
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II3   
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movants must: 
demonstrate (1) that they are reasonably likely to prevail eventually in the 
litigation and (2) that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury without relief.  
If these two threshold showings are made the District Court then considers, 
to the extent relevant, (3) whether an injunction would harm the [defendants] 
more than denying relief would harm the plaintiffs and (4) whether granting 
relief would serve the public interest. 
 
K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 
157 (3d Cir. 2002)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.4  We will examine each element in turn. 
A 
A plaintiff must establish a likelihood of success on the merits for the court to 
issue a preliminary injunction.  Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-
                                              
3 The District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  QuVa decided to omit 
from its amended answer its patent counterclaims, which would have vested exclusive 
jurisdiction over this appeal with the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a).  
The amended pleadings “supersede[] the original [pleadings] and render[ them] of no 
legal effect.”  W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 712 F.3d 
165, 171 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).   
4 The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is within the sound 
discretion of the district court.  Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24, 33 
(2008).  “In reviewing a preliminary-injunction order, findings of fact are assessed for 
clear error, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and the ultimate decision to grant 
relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  Issa v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121, 
130 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation and emphasis omitted).  To be clearly erroneous, a finding of 
fact must be “completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of 
credibility” or bear “no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.”  Id. at 
130 (quoting Havens v. Mobex Network Servs., LLC, 820 F.3d 80, 92 (3d Cir. 2016)).  
To constitute an abuse of discretion, a decision must be based on “a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.”  
Id. at 131. 
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Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012).  On this factor, “a sufficient degree of success 
for a strong showing exists if there is ‘a reasonable chance, or probability, of winning.’”  
In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted).  A 
reasonable chance of winning is one that is “significantly better than negligible but not 
necessarily more likely than not[.]”  Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 & 
n.3 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted).  Thus, at the preliminary injunction phase, 
the District Court here was not required to find that a preponderance of evidence 
established the merits of Par’s trade secret misappropriation claims to grant relief. 
Par alleged, among other things, trade secret claims under the federal Defend 
Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1836, and the New Jersey Trade Secrets Act 
(“NJTSA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. 56:15-2.  Both the DTSA and the NJTSA require claimants to 
demonstrate (1) the existence of a trade secret, defined broadly as information with 
independent economic value that the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep secret, 
and (2) misappropriation of that secret, defined as the knowing improper acquisition and 
use or disclosure of the secret.5  18 U.S.C. §§ 1836(b)(1), 1839(3), (5); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
56:15-2.  Par made adequate showings as to both its APS Plan and its vasopressin product 
formulation trade secrets.   
1 
                                              
5 Par also brought a trade secret claim under New Jersey common law, but we 
need not analyze that claim because the DTSA and NJTSA violations are a sufficient 
basis for the injunction.  In addition, because we need not rely on New Jersey common 
law, we need not address QuVa’s argument that the trade secret statutes of Texas and 
Michigan “abrogate common law trade secret claims,” Appellants’ Br. at 25-26 n.6.  
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Par demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the APS Plan was a trade secret.6  
The Plan discloses aspects of Par’s economically valuable FDA-mandated sterile 
manufacturing procedures.  Par took reasonable steps to protect the secrecy of its plan 
through the use of non-disclosure agreements and appropriate facility security measures.  
Moreover, the District Court’s conclusion that the APS plan was not publicly known is 
supported by several examples of non-public information from Par’s APS Plan that Par’s 
expert identified.   As the Court observed, “while some individual elements of the APS 
Plan may be known in the industry, Par’s combination of the elements” in its own process 
likely constitutes a trade secret itself.  J.A. 20.   
Par also demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of showing that the APS Plan was 
misappropriated.  First, portions of QuVa’s APS Plan are a verbatim copy of Par’s APS 
Plan, up to and including at least one typographical error.  Second, a former Par 
employee who joined QuVa instructed a QuVa consultant to use Par’s APS Plan as a 
“template” while drafting QuVa’s, apparently stripping the Par logo from the APS Plan 
before sending it to the consultant.  Third, that same former employee deleted an 
electronic copy of the Plan that he had kept from his time at Par despite being subject to a 
                                              
6 QuVa also argues that it was prejudiced by Par’s late identification of the APS 
Plan as a trade secret, and that the District Court abused its discretion in denying QuVa’s 
motion to strike it.  We disagree.  QuVa had the opportunity and in fact sought to refute 
Par’s assertion that the APS Plan is a trade secret through its own expert declaration.  
Moreover, Par had identified methods to meet FDA requirements among its trade secrets, 
which include the APS Plan.  Given the notice provided about the APS Plan, the 
opportunity to address it, and the lack of prejudice to QuVa, as well as the absence of bad 
faith on Par’s part, the Court correctly denied QuVa’s motion to strike reference to the 
APS Plan.  See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 791-92 (3d Cir. 1994).   
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litigation hold.  This action provides a basis to infer that this QuVa employee understood 
he wrongly possessed and used information Par would deem confidential.       
2 
Par also showed a reasonable likelihood of demonstrating that its vasopressin 
product formulations are a trade secret.  The formulations have independent economic 
value, as they are the blueprints for Par’s premix vasopressin products, and were chosen 
after years of testing.  As with the APS Plan, Par took reasonable steps to protect its 
product formulations.   
Moreover, QuVa’s arguments that Par formulations are publicly known are 
unavailing.  QuVa argues that hospitals were requesting a formulation with the specific 
diluent shared by Par and QuVa’s premix formulations because it was one of the two 
diluents hospitals commonly used to dilute existing concentrated vasopressin products, 
and further asserts that the use of each ingredient is public knowledge, as disclosed in 
industry literature and Par’s patents.  Common usage of the specific diluent in question to 
dilute concentrated vasopressin products, however, does not explain why customers 
would demand that a premix product (which, by its nature, does not require user dilution) 
use the same diluent.  In addition, as with the APS Plan, though “each and every element 
of plaintiff’s [ingredients in a product formulation may be] known to the industry, the 
combination of those elements may be a trade secret if it produces a product superior to 
that of competitors.”  Rohm and Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 433 (3d Cir. 
1982) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Furthermore, according to Par’s 
expert, the literature and patents publicly available at the time QuVa began 
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experimenting with its ready-to-use formula did not disclose the qualities that make the 
ingredients, when combined, the most effective.  Thus, the District Court had sufficient 
evidence to conclude that, at least before the publication of the ’881 Application, it was 
reasonably probable that QuVa would have needed Par’s trade secrets to arrive at its 
formulation. 
The District Court also did not clearly err in holding that Par demonstrated a 
reasonable probability of showing that QuVa misappropriated this trade secret.  As the 
Court emphasized, QuVa’s direct evidence of independent production of its formulation, 
which was comprised of limited testing of a small number of formulas over a matter of 
days, is sparse compared to the relatively extensive evidence of testing over the course of 
years that Par submitted.  This circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support the Court’s 
finding that it is reasonably probable QuVa misappropriated Par’s trade secrets.  See  SI 
Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1261 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Bimbo 
Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2010).7   
While additional discovery may reveal other evidence of QuVa’s independent 
development of its formulation, or other literature may reveal that Par’s formulations did 
not constitute trade secrets, we cannot conclude today that the District Court clearly erred 
in holding that Par met its burden of demonstrating a “significantly better than 
                                              
7 Though both of these cases arise under Pennsylvania law, New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania trade secret laws are substantially similar.  See Rohm & Haas Co., 689 F.2d 
at 429. 
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negligible” likelihood of success on the merits of its trade secret claims.  Reilly, 858 F.3d 
at 179.   
B 
Par also showed that an injunction was necessary to avoid irreparable harm.  The 
plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating imminent irreparable injury in the absence of 
an injunction.  Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992).  To 
be imminent, the injury cannot be remote or speculative; it must be poised to occur before 
the District Court can hold a trial on the merits.  See BP Chems. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. 
& Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Par presented evidence that if QuVa released a competing vasopressin product, Par 
would suffer: (1) difficult-to-quantify decreases in future sales of Par products that are 
currently in development, and (2) harm to Par’s reputation and “attractiveness to 
investors.”  J.A. 506; BP Chems. Ltd., 229 F.3d at 263 (stating “injuries to reputation” 
like those identified here “are difficult to calculate, and thus money damages [may be] an 
inadequate remedy”).   
In an effort to show that Par has not proven imminent irreparable harm, QuVa 
relies on Campbell Soup’s ruling that the plaintiff there failed to show imminent 
irreparable harm because there was no evidence that either company planned to use 
Campbell’s trade secret.  977 F.2d at 93.  Unlike the plaintiff in Campbell Soup, 
however, Par has demonstrated that its premix vasopressin product is far from theoretical.  
In addition to acquiring patents pertinent to various aspects of its product, Par also 
produced evidence that its premix vasopressin product had been in development through 
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2017, and that it is developing a particular product similar to QuVa’s.  There is nothing to 
suggest that Par’s product will not be ready for release before this case reaches trial.  
Meanwhile, until the injunction was issued, QuVa was imminently preparing to take the 
irreversible step of releasing its premix vasopressin product allegedly based on Par’s 
trade secrets, thus creating the threat of immediate irreparable harm to Par’s sales and 
reputation.  The District Court therefore had sufficient evidence to conclude that Par 
demonstrated immediate irreparable harm to support a preliminary injunction. 
C 
 The District Court also appropriately balanced both the equities and the public 
interest when considering whether to impose the injunction.  On this record, Par’s interest 
in protecting its trade secrets outweighs any harm QuVa may suffer from the injunction.  
Moreover, the public has a clear interest in ensuring fair business practices and 
safeguarding trade secrets.  See Nat’l Reprographics, Inc. v. Strom, 621 F. Supp. 2d 204, 
229 (D.N.J. 2009) (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 894 (N.J. 
1988)).   
D 
Having concluded a preliminary injunction is warranted, we next examine whether 
the District Court acted within its discretion in imposing an injunction through the trial.    
“Crafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise of discretion and judgment, often 
dependent as much on the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues it 
presents.”  Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (per 
curiam).  In trade secret cases, we have endorsed the use of “lead time” injunctions 
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“whereby the trade secret injunction lasts only so long as is necessary to negate the 
advantage the misappropriator would otherwise obtain by foregoing independent 
development.”  SI Handling Sys., 753 F.2d at 1266. 
 Par initially requested an injunction that blocks all of QuVa’s aseptic products.  
The District Court rejected this request and tailored the injunction to enjoin the marketing 
and sale of only vasopressin products through trial.  QuVa argues that the Court should 
have further limited this narrow injunction to only the “lead time” QuVa allegedly 
received by using Par’s trade secret, which QuVa argues lasted from the time it began 
work on its actual formulation in September 2017 until Par allegedly publicly disclosed 
the formulation in its ’881 Patent in October 2017.   
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in issuing an injunction for the 
“lead-time” that QuVa may have misappropriated.  See SI Handling Sys., 753 F.2d at 
1266.  The Court, however, did not make any factual findings as to the duration of that 
lead-time or explain whether this case presented any special circumstances that could 
possibly warrant imposing an injunction longer than the period QuVa allegedly 
misappropriated a trade secret.  Instead, the District Court seemingly recognized that the 
misappropriation of the APS Plan would not justify a lengthy injunction by noting that it 
“was not the only basis on which Par has demonstrated a likelihood of success” and 
observed that the ’881 Application was published only after QuVa began experimenting 
with a ready-to-use vasopressin formula.  J.A. 28.  Although the timing of the ’881 
Application’s publication informs Par’s likelihood of success, it does not necessarily 
support an indefinite injunction.  It would make little sense to impose a multi-year 
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injunction if Par voluntarily disclosed its trade secret shortly after the alleged 
misappropriation began.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s issuance of an 
injunction and remand for it to conduct further fact-finding concerning the duration of the 
injunction and, if need be, to consider the other alleged trade secrets Par raised in its 
preliminary injunction motion.  
III 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part the District Court’s order granting 
the preliminary injunction and remand for the District Court to conduct further fact-
finding on the proper length of the injunction and, if need be, to consider the other 
alleged trade secrets.  This injunction shall remain in effect pending the District Court’s 
decision on remand. 
